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In this paper,we document empiricalregularitiesin theforeign aidﬂows to developingcountries over
the last three decades. In spite of a large body of literature on foreign aid and its impact on recipients,
surprisingly little is known about its business cycle characteristics. We show that for the vast majority of
African recipients, aid ﬂows are a major source of income that is highly volatile and, most importantly,
overwhelmingly procyclical. For recipients outside of Africa, we ﬁnd a similar – if somewhat less
pronounced – pattern of aid procyclicality. In contrast, there is little evidence of aid procyclicality with
the business cycle of donors. In light of the very high volatility of output in developing countries, the
procyclicality of foreign aid ﬂows from the recipients’ perspective raises serious questions related to
their welfare and growth.
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11 Introduction
In this paper, we document some key business cycle properties of foreign aid ﬂows to developing countries.
We identify two striking empirical regularities. First, aid ﬂows are highly volatile over time – on average,
two to three times as volatile as therecipient’s output. Second, formost African countries, net aidinﬂows are
strongly positively correlated with their domestic output. Outside of Africa, we ﬁnd a similar, if somewhat
less pronounced, pattern of aid procyclicality.
To understand why these empirical regularities are important, recall that output ﬂuctuations in developing
countries are much stronger than in industrialized economies. Indeed, we document that the gross domestic
product of an aid recipient is several times as volatile as that of a donor. For developing countries, though,
customary ways to smooth out the impact of output ﬂuctuations on domestic consumption are likely to be
very onerous. For instance, it has been argued that, because of moral hazard and repudiation risk, heavily
indebted nations are often denied new loans (or are asked to repay old ones) precisely when their economies
suffer adverse shocks – see, e.g., Atkeson (1991). At the same time, foreign aid is a major source of income
to recipients, especially in Africa, where it averages 12.5% of gross domestic product and constitutes by far
the main source of foreign capital. In such an environment, foreign aid has the potential to play a key role in
smoothing out developing countries’ output ﬂuctuations. Our results imply that, all in all, aid ﬂows do not
play that role.
Admittedly, it might be argued that, except for emergency relief, the chief purpose of aid is not to act as an
insurance device but, instead, to fuel economic development, in which case it is not clear a priori whether
one should expect aid ﬂows to be procyclical or countercyclical. It is well established, however, that output
ﬂuctuations affect growth negatively – see, e.g., Hamilton (1989) and Ramey & Ramey (1995). Hence, even
if aid were meant solely to help foster growth, serious concerns would nonetheless arise from the fact that
aid disbursement patterns contribute to the volatility of developing countries’ disposable income.
Our ﬁndings are robust. Our data set comprises various yearly aid and output series for sixty-three recipient
and eighteendonor countries between 1969and 1995. We ﬁnd few differences betweenthe cyclical behavior
of multilateral as opposed to bilateral aid disbursements, even though multilateral aid ﬂows are relatively
more volatile than their bilateral counterparts. Likewise, aid commitments ﬂuctuate more than actual net
disbursements, but both commitments and disbursements are procyclical. We also pay special attention
to Africa, because it is the region where aid is largest relative to recipient GDP and aid procyclicality is
most striking. Regardless of the measure used for domestic output, net aid receipts are procyclical for at
least two-thirds of the thirty-eight countries in our African subsample and are countercyclical for, at most,
a few of them. Key components of African aid ﬂows, such as grants or technical assistance, are as strongly
2procyclical as total aid ﬂows. Finally, we ﬁnd no evidence that the procyclicality of aid is a function of an
African recipient’s former colonial power, its choice of exchange rate regime or some other criterion.
We complete the paper by analyzing the cyclical properties of aid ﬂows from donors’ perspective. Even
though overall aid disbursements are positively correlated with donor output, aid disbursements to the recip-
ient countries in our sample are not. A corollary is that the procyclicality of aid inﬂows experienced by those
aid recipients is not the mere result of the conjunction of (i) positive comovements between North-South
business cycles [Kouparitsas (1998); Ag´ enor, McDermott, & Prasad (1999)] and (ii) a positive correlation
between donors’ aid policies and their business cycles.
Despite a large body of literature on foreign aid, surprisingly little is known about the business cycle prop-
erties of aid ﬂows. Our contribution is to identify a series of key empirical regularities pertaining to aid
and the business cycle. The philosophy of the present paper, in that sense, is similar to that of Kydland &
Prescott (1990).1 Clearly, we expose ourselves to the criticism that we do “measurement without explicit
theory.” Given the sheer magnitude of aid ﬂows for the recipients, and the likely signiﬁcant welfare and
growth consequences of aid disbursement patterns, we think that the facts we report are important in their
own right and should therefore guide the construction of theoretical models of foreign aid.
Much of the literature on foreign aid has focused on how aid levels affect the growth of recipient countries.
On the one hand, Boone (1994, 1996) shows that, within a growth model of a recipient country, aid is fully
consumed. He then argues that the model’s prediction is veriﬁed empirically for a large set of countries
over a ten–year period. Easterly (1999) makes a similar point. On the other hand, several recent papers
ﬁnd that aid has a positive effect on growth, although they suggest that the relationship between aid and
growth may depend on the recipient’s having adopted sound economic policies [Burnside & Dollar (1997)]
or, independent of the policy mix, is signiﬁcant but non-linear [Hansen & Tarp (2000)]. In contrast to all
these studies, Lensink & Morrissey (1999) analyze the impact of aid uncertainty on growth. Their results
suggest that the effect of aid on growth is a function, not only of aid levels, but also of the stability of aid
ﬂows.
Our paper is also connected to the literature that derives optimal patterns of capital ﬂows to developing
countries. Most of that literature models commercial loans to sovereign borrowers [e.g., Atkeson (1991) and
Marcet & Marimon (1992)]. More closely related to the present paper is Svensson(1995), who characterizes
optimal aid disbursement policies within a two–date agency model of the relationship between an altruistic
donor and a pair of recipients. Svensson (1995) shows that, in a ﬁrst–best environment in which policies
1Other papers documenting business cycle factsinclude Cooley &Ohanian (1991)Backus & Kehoe(1992), Fiorito &Kollintzas
(1994), Chadha & Prasad (1994) or, more recently, Ambler, Cardia, & Zimmermann (1999).
3could be fully contracted on, aid receipts would be countercyclical. However, because of its limited ability
to monitor the recipient’s use of aid, the donor can at best achieve a second–best outcome in which aid is tied
to the recipient’s economic performance. As a result, aid receipts increase when a good output realization
occurs. In that sense, second-best aid receipts may be procyclical.
Finally, our paper is at the intersection of two recent strands of literature. The ﬁrst studies various business
cycle phenomena in developing countries – see, in particular, Mendoza (1992, 1995), Carmichael, Samson,
& Keita (1999), Talvi & V´ egh (1998) and Ag´ enor et al. (1999). The second studies the business cycle
properties of international capital ﬂows – see, e.g., Lane (1999). In contrast to all these papers, we focus on
the empirical regularities of foreign aid to developing countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our data and discuss measurement issues. In
Section 3, we document empirical regularities of aid ﬂows from both recipients’ and donors’ perspectives.
In Section 4, we discuss our ﬁndings and conclude.
2 Measurement and data
We analyze the business cycle properties of foreign aid ﬂows received by developing countries between
1969 and 1995. A recipient country is excluded from our sample if: (i) it had not achieved independence by
the end of 1975; (ii) fewer than twenty consecutive years of data are available for that country; or (iii) the
country was a net donor of aid in some years (e.g., Libya). For the remaining countries, we only consider the
largest block of contiguous data-years during which the country was independent. Our sample of recipients
comprises sixty-three countries, thirty-eight of which are located in Africa. When we analyze the cyclical
behavior of aid from the donor’s perspective, we focus on members of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development [OECD] that belong to its Development Assistance Committee [DAC]. Of the
twenty–one current DAC member countries, we eliminate three due to lack of sufﬁcient aid data. For the
remaining eighteen, we again only consider the largest block of contiguous data-years.
2.1 Aid ﬂows
The conventional measure of foreign aid is the Ofﬁcial Development Assistance [ODA] numbers published
by the OECD. This measure encompasses grants, the value of technical assistance, and concessional loans.
We employ data for net ODA disbursements and for ODA commitments (“ﬁrm obligations to disburse that
are supported by the availability of public funds”).
Because loans are classiﬁed by the OECD as concessional when they have at least a 25% grant component,
4using net ODA disbursements to measure aid may overstate the actual amount donated. The overstatement
should be small in our African subsample since the median grant element, reported by the OECD, exceeds
90%.2 Still, Chang, Fernandez-Arias, & Serven (1998) argue that the OECD ﬁgures overstate the grant
element of ODA loans. We therefore veriﬁed the robustness of our results to the exclusion of ODA loans,
by analyzing the cyclical behavior of grants only.3
There is no a priori reason why the aid policy of individual donors should be similar to that of international
organizations such as the World Bank. In order to capture possible differences, we therefore decompose O-
DA into multilateral[Mult] and bilateral[Bilat] aid. The ﬁrst component measures aid given byinternational
organizations, while the second component encompasses all government-to-government aid distributed by
DAC member countries.4
All aid series consist of annual data and are expressed in current US$. We transform them in per capita real
terms using methods explained below.
2.2 Real output and aid
Each dollar of resources available to a recipient country can be spent on foreign or domestic goods and
services. Because of differences in purchasing power, the real value of an aid dollar differs whether it be
spent abroad or locally.
In light of evidence that foreign exchange constraints are important in limiting the quantity of goods a
developing country can import [Stryker & Tuluy (1989)],5 we use actual dollar ﬁgures for both output and
aid. This approach helps us capture the ability of a country to import and the role of aid in lessening
foreign exchange constraints. We employ, as measure of recipient output, the ofﬁcial per capita Gross
Domestic Product [GDP] at market prices in current US$ recorded in the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators [WDI] (1998). Consistently, we deﬂate GDP and aid series using each country’s implicit import
deﬂator (1990=100), which we compute from the WDI. This deﬂator captures the changes in the price of
2OECD data on the grant component of concessional loans to individual recipients is available from 1983 onward.
3We also veriﬁed the robustness of our results to an alternative measure of aid: the country’s net receipts of Ofﬁcial Transfers
[OT] reported until 1992 in the World Bank’s World Tables (1994). This second measure combines grants, the value of technical
assistance, and food aid, but not concessional loans. We obtained very comparable results.
4Our measure of bilateral aid therefore excludes bilateral aid from Arab sources. In general, the exclusion should matter little in
our sample. Admittedly, there are six countries for which Arab aid is of importance: Jordan (67.8%), Mauritania (34.2%), Morocco
(25%), Somalia (10.8%), Sudan (22%) and Tunisia (12.8%). Across all countries in our sample and all years, however, the median
ratio of Arab bilateral ODA to bilateral receipts from all sources is a mere 0.01%.
5See also Krueger, Michalopoulos, & Ruttan (1989) for a review of that literature.
5the country’s typical basket of imports.6
It can be argued that this ﬁrst approach is inappropriate if the country’s available resources are used princi-
pally for domestic purchases. In that case, output and aid may be better expressed in US dollars adjusted for
differences in purchasing power parities. In a sensitivity analysis, we took that perspective: we measured
output as Real Gross Domestic Product per capita, from the Summers & Heston (1991) Penn World Tables
(Mark 5.6), and adjusted aid dollar series consistently. Results were not qualitatively affected by that second
measurement approach.
To assess the business cycle properties of aid from a donor’s perspective, the appropriate numeraire is that
donor’s local currency. Gross domestic product ﬁgures for our eighteen donors come from the OECD Sta-
tistical Compendium (1998). Aid series are converted into local currency using the current dollar exchange
rate from the Statistical Compendium. Both aid and output series are expressed in per capita terms and
deﬂated using the local GDP deﬂator (OECD, 1990=100).
2.3 Business cycles
Following Lucas (1977) and Kydland & Prescott (1990), we deﬁne business cycles as the deviations of out-
put from trend, and business cycle facts as the statistical properties of the comovements of output deviations
from trend with deviations from trend of other aggregate time series. When examining the business cycle
aspects of foreign aid, we ﬁrst detrend each data series using the Hodrick & Prescott (1980) [HP] ﬁlter. For
any series
￿ , the HP ﬁlter extracts the growth component
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is a weight that reﬂects the relative variance of the two components. We adopt the value of
￿
=100,
which is conventional for yearly data.7 We work throughout with the logarithms of the series, because we
are mainly interested in percentage deviations from trend. In line with Baxter & King (1995), we ensure
that our results are not affected by abnormal behavior at the end points of the series, by dropping the ﬁrst
and last two detrended observations before computing moments of the cyclical components of each series.
6For the few countries whose GDP data were not available in the WDI, ﬁgures from the World Bank World Tables (1995) were
used instead. Likewise, when the implicit import deﬂator could not be calculated, we employed instead the Import Price Index
computed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] and reported in the World Bank World Tables
(1995).
7See, e.g., Backus & Kehoe (1992). Our results are robust to using
’ =10, a value which is also acceptable.
6To assess the business cycle properties of foreign aid, we compute the correlations between the cyclical
components of aid and output, contemporaneously and with the series shifted backward or forward up to two
years. As is customary [Kydland & Prescott (1982), Cooley & Prescott (1995)], a positive contemporaneous
correlation means that aid receipts are procyclical, whereas a negative contemporaneous correlation implies
that aid ﬂows are countercyclical. In case of procyclicality, we identify possible phase shifts (leads and lags)
by how early or how late with respect to the contemporaneous period the highest correlation appears.
3 Empirical regularities
Over the period 1969-1995, we identify the following empirical regularities:
1. Foreign aid is a major source of income for recipients. In Africa, the average fraction of net ODA re-
ceipts to GDP is 12.5%, the median is 10.3% (see Table 1, Panel I). For some of the poorest countries,
ODA inﬂows even exceed one third of GDP over the sample period: Somalia (34.2%), Guinea Bissau
(44.2%) and Cape Verde (47.2%).8
The relative importance of aid makes Africa special. For developing countries outside of Africa, aid,
while still important, is not as large relative to domestic output. Net ODA receipts average 4% of their
GDP, with a median ratio of 2% (Table 1, Panel II).
– From those aid ﬂows, the largest share is made through bilateral channels. In Africa, bilateral
aid receipts are on average 70% higher than multilateral ones; for recipients outside of Africa,
bilateral aid is almost twice as large as multilateral aid (Table 1).
– Commitments of all sources are typically larger than disbursements. Over the sample period,
African recipients are on average promised aid ﬂows 2% of GDP more than what they receive
(Table 1). Outside of Africa, ﬁrm promises to disburse average 1% of GDP more than actual
disbursements. Although one could think that some promises never materialize, the explanation
is likely simpler: disbursements are net of possible principal repayments, whereas commitments
are not.
2. Recipients’ output is much more volatile than industrialized countries’ output. The ﬁrst column of
Table 2 displays the volatility of the cyclical component of output in recipient countries. We compute
8For, African countries, furthermore, foreign aid is by far the largest source of foreign capital. We computed that, between 1975
and 1995, across all African recipients in our sample, net ODA receipts averaged more than 92% of all net capital inﬂows, private
and public, reported by the OECD.
7the volatility of each series as the standard deviation of its cyclical component. This measure is
appealing because it is expressed in percentage terms and is directly comparable across series.
For African countries in our sample, the volatility of GDP averages 13.2% over the period 1969-
95. For the remaining developing countries in our sample, the ﬁgure is 12.9%. Those ﬁgures are
consistent with the volatility ﬁgures documented by Mendoza (1995) and Carmichael et al. (1999)
for, respectively, 23 and 19 developing or recently industrialized countries using yearly data, and by
Ag´ enor et al. (1999) for 12 middle income countries using quarterly data.
The magnitude of output ﬂuctuations in donor countries (Table 3), by comparison, is a lot smaller,
with an average volatility of 2.19% over the same period (2.18% in the United States). In other words,
shocks to poor countries are about six times more severe than shocks to industrialized countries.9
3. Aid ﬂows are even more volatile. The volatility of net ODA receipts averages approximatively twice
that of recipient GDP, both in Africa and outside of Africa (Table 2, second column).10 Multilateral
aid ﬂows are more volatile than bilateral ones, and commitments from all sources are more volatile
than receipts.
4. In Africa, aid inﬂows are overwhelmingly procyclical. For more than two-thirds (26) of the African
recipients in our sample, the cyclical component of ODA receipts is strongly positively correlated
with the cyclical component of domestic output. Only 2 African countries in 38 (5%) experience
countercyclical net ODA receipts. Table 4 summarizes the cyclical properties of foreign aid from
recipients’ perspective, which are then detailed in Table 5. Figure 1 provides a snapshot of this result
and shows that countries for which aid inﬂows are negatively correlated with output are the exception.
OutsideofAfrica, aidprocyclicality issomewhat lesspronounced: 4recipientsin25(16%)experience
countercyclical aid ﬂows, whereas for 12 others (48%) net ODA receipts are procyclical. Aid is
acyclical for the remaining 9 countries.
Over the entire sample, we ﬁnd few differences between the cyclical properties of bilateral and mul-
tilateral aid receipts, the latter being procyclical for just 3 more countries than the former.
9This number only partly reﬂects the choice of a different deﬂator for both sets of countries. Indeed, when Summers & Heston
(1991) output ﬁgures and deﬂators are used for both donors and recipients alike, the volatility of output is still much stronger for
recipients than for donors. For example, the median output volatility becomes 5.9% for African recipients, which is still more than
2.5 times the ﬁgure for the United States.
10Our measure of volatility (the percentage deviation from trend) is appropriate to assess the relative magnitude of ﬂuctuations.
Clearly, if one were to think in terms of absolute variations, one would need to correct that relative volatility by the share of net
ODA receipts in GDP.
8– Commitmentsarenotcountercyclical. Ifthere aredelaysbeforeaidcanbedisbursed, thecyclical
properties of aid commitments may differ from those of actual disbursements. As Table 4 and
Figure 1 suggest, aid commitments are less clearly procyclical. There is hardly any evidence,
however, of stronger countercyclicality.
– Leads and lags are a minor issue. For one ﬁfth of the countries with procyclical aid ﬂows, ODA
receipts lag the cycle; leads are identiﬁed for just 4 countries and, for the remainder, the highest
correlation of disbursements with GDP is the contemporaneous one. Bilateral and multilateral
aid show a similar pattern. So do commitments.
– Grants are procyclical as well. For African recipients, we also analyzed the comovements of
output and some of the components of ODA, such as grants and technical assistance [TA] (which
onaverage accountsfor30%of grants). Wedonotreportthesecorrelationsinthe tables,because
the results are strikingly similar: grants are procyclical for two-thirds of the recipients, while
technical assistance is procyclical for 76% of African recipients.
– No subgroup of countries seems to stand out.
( Figure 2 plots, for each recipient, the contemporaneous correlation between the cyclical
components of ODA and GDP against (i) the average level of per-capita output over the
sample period, (ii) the volatility of output and (iii) a measure of aid dependency, the av-
erage ODA-GDP ratio. First, whether for African recipients, non-African recipients or
overall, we ﬁnd that the relationship between the correlation and average GDP is both weak
and statistically insigniﬁcant. Next, the only statistically signiﬁcant relationship between
aid procyclicality and the volatility of GDP is for non-African recipients (higher levels of
output volatility are associated with greater correlations). Finally, once we exclude the three
countries for which aid amounts to more than 30% of GDP, we ﬁnd no relationship between
the procyclicality of aid inﬂows and the ODA-GDP ratio.11
( There appears to be no qualitative difference between former colonies of France or the
United Kingdom with respect to the comovements of aid and output. Likewise, the twelve
franc-CFA countries in our sample display no major difference from the rest.
– In Figures 3 A-C, we plot the data for a selection of countries. Burkina Faso and Madagascar,
for example, are obvious cases of procyclical ODA disbursements (especially after 1976 for
11Naturally, if aid is sufﬁciently massive relative to GDP, it should be expected that increases in aid would raise output directly
(through aggregate demand effects, or the relaxation of foreign exchange constraints for critical imports). Consistent with this
conjecture, if we do not exclude the three African countries for which ODA receipts exceed 30% of GDP, we ﬁnd a weakly positive
(but statistically signiﬁcant) relationship between aid procyclicality and the ODA-GDP ratio.
9Burkina Faso). Botswana also exhibits positive comovements between ODA and GDP, although
there appears to be a lead after 1978. In the case of Senegal, ODA lags the cycle by one year.
In contrast, Mali is clearly a country with countercyclical aid. ODA disbursements and GDP in
Niger and the Central African Republic are essentially uncorrelated, although in the case of the
latter, one could possibly identify a period of procyclical ODA prior to 1983.
5. Results are robust. In addition to the above, we carried out a series of robustness checks for African
countries, because the latter are the recipients for which aid procyclicality is most striking. Our results
are robust to:
– an alternative measure of output. Instead of the World Bank GDP numbers, we employed real
GDP ﬁgures from the Summers-Heston Penn World Tables, which are adjusted for purchasing
power differences. As discussed in Section 2, we consistently adjusted the aidseries and deﬂated
all ﬁgures with the implicit GDP deﬂator from their dataset;
– two measures of aid that do not encompass concessional loans, for which the aid component
may arguably be overstated. Instead of net ODA receipts, we took ofﬁcial transfers [OT] from
the World Bank World Tables (1994); as mentioned above, we also simply used ODA grants
reported by the OECD.
– an alternative deﬂator: instead of the import deﬂator computed from the World Bank WDI, we
used the imports price index (IPI) from the UNCTAD.
In none of these sensitivity analyses were our results qualitatively altered.
6. Donors give on average less than 0.3% of their own GDP. Over the 1969-1995 period, the most
generous donor in our sample is the Netherlands, with an average ratio of ODA disbursements to
GDP of 0.58% (Table 6). Aid to African recipients in our sample averages 0.08% of donors’ GDP,
or 29% of all aid disbursements. Other recipient countries in our sample receive 25% of all aid. For
likely similar reasons as above, commitments appear higher on average than actual disbursements.
7. Aid outﬂows are very volatile. The magnitude of the ﬂuctuations in ODA disbursements is on average
almost nine times that of donors’ output. Disbursements to our African sample are eleven times as
volatile as donors’ output (Table 3).
8. Overall aid outﬂows are procyclical, but aid disbursements to recipients in our sample are not. While
a few donors have aid policies that are uncorrelated, or even negatively correlated (France and Italy)
with their business cycle, donors tend to give more in good times: the comovements of total aid
10disbursements with donors’ output are positive for 72% of donors (Table 7). For 85% of these, aid
disbursements lag their cycle.
Donors, however, do not give in a procyclical fashion to recipients in our sample: for African recip-
ients, only 39% of donors do (they account for only 20% of bilateral ﬂows to these countries, and
21% of bilateral ﬂows to those recipients whose aid inﬂows we report as procyclical); for non-African
recipients, 33% of donors give in a procyclical way. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the positive
correlation between recipients’ GDP and aid receipts can be explained by the positive comovements
of North and South business cycles documented in Kouparitsas (1998) and Ag´ enor et al. (1999).
What shall we make of all these facts? The ﬁrst message from our results is that aid is a very important
source of income for recipient countries. If one is interested in economic outcomes in these countries, then
one should certainly think about the role played by foreign aid.
Second, the magnitude of output ﬂuctuations experienced by these countries is much stronger than that of
industrialized countries in the postwar period. This fact is not new, though we extend previous estimates of
output volatility to a much larger set of developing countries. What is rather striking, however, is the fact
that foreign aid is even more volatile than recipient GDP and, especially in Africa, moves in a procyclical
fashion. Because of the intense variability of output, the welfare implications of any mechanism to smooth
out the impact of output ﬂuctuations on consumption are likely to be large. One might think of aid ﬂows as
one such mechanism, among others such as domestic savings. The procyclicality of aid receipts, however,
suggests that aid ﬂows per se do not play that role. Of course, it can rightly be argued that, except for some
components of aid such as food aid, consumption smoothing is not the mainpurpose of foreign aid. Another,
obvious role of foreign aid is to foster the economic development of recipient countries. The high variability
of output in these countries, however, might be an important handicap for economic growth, as the results
of Ramey & Ramey (1995) have shown. In that case, the procyclicality of aid ﬂows, by intensifying the
volatility of disposable income, might hurt growth. Clearly, this discussion goes beyond the scope of this
paper, but it illustrates well the importance of the facts we report here. If one is interested in the welfare or
the growth of recipient countries, one cannot not be interested in the pattern of disbursements.
Another message from our results is that Africa is special in many respects. That region of the world
is the one for which aid matters most. It is also the region for which aid receipts are most often and most
strongly procyclical. Although Africa represents a relatively small fraction of donors’ aid effort, aid is a very
signiﬁcant share of income in that part of the world. Finally, Africa is special among all aid recipients, in
that donors have different aid policies to Africa than to the rest: while total aid disbursements are procyclical
from the donors’ perspective, such is not the case for aid disbursements to Africa.
114 Discussion and conclusion
In this section, we discuss possible explanations for the procyclicality of aid.
A ﬁrst, simple explanation is that aid may feed into the recipient’s output. If such a multiplier effect is not
immediate, one would expect to observe aid receipts leading the cycle. Our results, however, show that this
is almost never the case. If such feedback is rapid, one would expect the contemporaneous correlation of
aid and output to be directly related to the importance of aid relative to the recipient’s domestic income.
Yet, while we do ﬁnd procyclical aid receipts for the three countries that depend most heavily on aid, we
document even stronger aid procyclicality for some other countries that depend much less on aid. Indeed,
once those three extreme cases are removed from our sample, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant relation be-
tween the aid-output correlation and the recipients’ average aid-output ratio (a measure of aid dependency).
Overall, then, our ﬁndings suggest the need for additional explanations of aid procyclicality.
Domestic political or ﬁscal considerations may lead donor countries to adjust aid ﬂows to their own business
cycle. As a result, donors may disburse procyclically, which, given a positive correlation between North-
South business cycles, might lead to procyclical aid receipts. And indeed, total aid disbursements by donors
were shown to be procyclical for a vast majority of donors. Yet, when we looked at disbursements to the
countries in our recipient sample, we found that they were typically not procyclical from the perspective of
donors.
Alesina & Dollar (1998) make a case that bilateral aid policies are conditioned on political, much more than
other, factors. Their results show that, in particular, former colonial ties are a big determinant of foreign
aid policy. Why this would lead to procyclical aid ﬂows is unclear. In any case, we ﬁnd similar patterns of
bilateral aid procyclicality among former African colonies of France and the United Kingdom.
Aid disbursements could also be conditioned on the periodic observation of some indicator of good econom-
ic performance, in which case aid ﬂows would be procyclical – contemporaneously or with a lag, depending
on the periodicity of the monitoring. On the other hand, one might also make the argument that aid could
be conditional on the adoption by the recipient of some policies, such as compliance with an IMF struc-
tural adjustment program. In the latter case, aid would rather be expected to be countercyclical, since such
programs often entail short-term costs in terms of output. Of the twelve countries in our African sample
classiﬁed as IMF sustained adjusters, however, only two experienced countercyclical aid inﬂows (Tanzania
and Mali); for most of the others, aid was procyclical.
Another possible explanation is that some donors require matching grants by the recipient. To the extent that
the latter has more resources during cyclical upturns, some procyclicality of foreign aid disbursements may
12follow from such donor requirements. This effect may be reinforced if, in cyclical downturns, recipients are
held to strict budget deﬁcit targets by international organizations and foreign grants are not taken into ac-
count when computing these targets (as is sometimes the International Monetary Fund’s practice in Africa).
The effect might also be reinforced if bilateral aid agencies condition their assistance on multilateral aid.
Many competing explanations may have a part in the cyclical behavior of aid receipts. Given the likely
important welfare and growth consequences of volatile and procyclical aid receipts, the facts we report in
thispaperseemto standas aninterestinganomalyto beexplained. How muchof thefacts canberationalized
by any theory is a sound question. Such a quantitative assessment would require the construction of a model
of foreign aid policy, which the empirical regularities we have reported here only purport to guide.
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15Table 1: Importance of foreign aid to recipients - Panel I: Africa
Mean fraction of recipient’s GDP (%)
Net receipts Commitments
ODA Mult Bilat ODA Mult Bilat
Benin 9.2 4.0 5.1 11.6 5.2 6.3
Botswana 9.8 1.9 7.7 12.7 2.5 10.0
Burkina Faso 13.1 4.6 8.4 15.9 6.0 9.5
Burundi 15.9 7.8 7.9 18.2 9.6 8.2
Cameroon 4.0 1.1 2.8 5.0 1.3 3.7
Cape Verde 47.2 15.1 31.3 57.1 19.9 35.5
Central Afr. Rep. 12.9 5.0 7.8 14.3 5.7 8.5
Chad 16.2 6.8 9.1 18.7 8.5 10.1
Congo 6.3 1.6 4.5 7.1 1.9 5.1
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire 4.1 1.3 2.9 5.3 1.3 3.9
Egypt 7.4 1.1 3.9 7.8 0.8 6.5
Gabon 2.8 0.5 2.2 3.3 0.5 2.7
Gambia 22.9 10.1 12.0 26.9 12.3 13.8
Ghana 5.9 2.7 3.1 7.6 3.4 4.1
Guinea Bissau 44.2 17.2 25.1 49.5 22.2 25.4
Kenya 7.1 2.1 4.9 8.6 2.5 6.0
Lesotho 22.6 8.9 13.6 27.1 11.7 15.2
Liberia 6.0 1.7 4.2 7.1 2.2 4.9
Madagascar 7.3 2.9 4.2 8.8 4.0 4.8
Malawi 16.5 8.0 8.6 20.3 9.6 10.7
Mali 16.8 6.5 9.5 19.9 8.0 11.1
Mauritania 22.2 7.6 8.4 22.1 9.3 9.4
Mauritius 2.9 0.8 2.1 4.0 1.2 2.7
Morocco 3.1 0.4 1.7 3.4 0.5 2.2
Niger 11.9 3.9 7.5 13.4 4.6 8.3
Nigeria 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.4
Rwanda 12.7 4.4 8.1 14.6 6.0 8.5
Senegal 11.0 3.4 7.0 12.7 4.1 7.8
Seychelles 14.2 1.3 12.7 18.4 2.3 15.4
Sierra Leone 4.8 1.9 2.8 6.7 2.6 3.9
Somalia 34.2 12.4 14.9 36.4 14.4 18.8
Sudan 6.3 2.1 2.7 6.8 2.6 3.1
Swaziland 6.9 2.3 4.6 9.0 2.9 6.1
Tanzania 16.8 4.4 12.3 20.8 6.3 14.3
Togo 10.7 4.4 6.2 12.4 5.1 7.2
Tunisia 3.6 0.6 2.7 5.2 0.8 3.9
Zaire 3.7 1.2 2.5 4.2 1.4 2.8
Zambia 12.5 4.5 7.9 13.0 4.0 8.9
Average 12.5 4.4 7.5 14.7 5.5 8.7
Median 10.3 3.2 6.6 12.6 4.0 7.5
Standard Deviation 10.6 4.1 6.2 12.1 5.2 6.8
16Table 1 - Panel II: Non-African recipients
Mean fraction of recipient’s GDP (%)
Net receipts Commitments
ODA Mult Bilat ODA Mult Bilat
Bangladesh 8.1 3.1 4.7 10.5 4.3 5.9
Bolivia 6.6 2.2 4.3 8.6 3.2 5.4
Costa Rica 2.7 0.5 2.2 3.3 0.8 2.5
Dominican Rep. 1.6 0.5 1.1 2.3 0.9 1.4
Ecuador 1.3 0.5 0.8 1.9 0.8 1.1
Guatemala 1.5 0.4 1.1 2.0 0.7 1.3
Guyana 10.3 6.3 4.0 14.8 8.1 6.7
Haiti 8.2 2.6 5.7 10.2 4.1 6.2
Honduras 6.0 2.1 3.9 8.1 3.3 4.7
India 1.0 0.4 0.6 1.4 0.6 0.8
Indonesia 1.9 0.2 1.7 2.9 0.3 2.5
Jamaica 3.8 0.6 3.2 5.3 1.0 4.4
Jordan 16.0 1.3 4.3 14.6 1.8 5.4
Malaysia 0.6 0.1 0.6 1.0 0.1 0.9
Mexico 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
Nepal 7.6 3.2 4.4 9.9 5.0 4.9
Pakistan 3.5 1.1 2.0 4.6 1.6 2.9
Panama 1.4 0.4 1.0 1.8 0.6 1.2
Paraguay 2.0 0.8 1.2 2.9 1.3 1.6
Peru 1.1 0.2 0.9 1.3 0.3 1.0
Philippines 1.6 0.2 1.4 2.3 0.2 2.1
Salvador 4.7 1.0 3.7 6.1 1.4 4.6
Sri Lanka 6.5 2.1 4.3 8.5 2.8 5.6
Thailand 0.9 0.1 0.7 1.2 0.2 1.1
Uruguay 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4
Average 4.0 1.2 2.3 5.1 1.7 3.0
Median 2.0 0.5 1.7 2.9 0.9 2.5
Standard Deviation 3.9 1.4 1.7 4.4 2.0 2.1
Notes: GDP is the gross domestic product in US$ (Source: World Bank). ODA
is the ofﬁcial development assistance, in US$ (Source: OECD). Mult and Bilat
are the multilateral and bilateral components of ODA. All series are expressed in
per capita terms and deﬂated using the implicit imports deﬂator (Source: World
Bank) or, when missing, the UNCTAD’s imports price index. Each number cor-
responds to the average ratio of the relevant series over the period 1969-95, ex-
cept for Burundi (1972-95), Cape Verde (1975-93), Guinea Bissau (1974-95),
Liberia and Somalia (1969-89), Niger, Rwanda, Seychelles, Tanzania and Zaire
(1969-93), SierraLeone(1969-90), Sudan(1969-91),Bangladesh(1972-95), Bo-
livia and Guyana (1969-94), and Jordan (1976-95).
17Table 2: Volatility of output and foreign aid to recipients - Panel I: Africa
Standard deviation (%)
Net receipts Commitments
GDP ODA Mult Bilat ODA Mult Bilat
Benin 11.1 17.0 18.0 20.6 28.4 40.7 40.3
Botswana 10.4 16.2 31.6 19.6 25.0 35.1 34.3
Burkina Faso 9.1 17.4 27.5 14.0 14.5 41.4 18.9
Burundi 8.6 8.7 17.8 10.0 23.9 44.5 21.9
Cameroon 10.2 26.5 57.7 24.3 23.2 53.6 26.2
Cape Verde 11.1 21.8 38.0 24.4 21.2 40.8 20.0
Central Afr. Rep. 10.7 15.3 28.4 16.1 24.5 54.7 21.9
Chad 13.6 33.6 38.7 33.9 42.7 58.5 38.7
Congo 19.2 20.6 33.5 23.2 39.5 64.4 41.2
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire 10.7 15.1 62.2 14.5 25.2 61.9 25.3
Egypt 13.7 48.2 61.3 49.2 46.7 44.5 48.6
Gabon 23.3 25.9 50.9 27.8 42.1 79.7 41.9
Gambia 14.4 24.9 29.2 25.8 36.1 50.8 32.3
Ghana 30.8 39.1 37.9 44.1 39.8 54.2 45.7
Guinea Bissau 20.7 22.6 17.4 46.3 37.9 49.6 46.4
Kenya 9.2 16.6 37.6 13.8 28.0 52.0 30.1
Lesotho 10.5 14.5 18.5 16.3 29.1 39.8 30.0
Liberia 6.4 23.3 27.4 35.0 31.1 73.4 32.3
Madagascar 10.1 20.1 24.0 22.2 24.3 32.9 25.7
Malawi 10.7 17.6 24.0 22.1 30.4 44.9 38.5
Mali 10.1 17.2 16.3 21.8 23.0 29.9 30.1
Mauritania 8.9 33.4 33.4 26.0 24.9 35.9 18.5
Mauritius 9.4 26.7 na 27.6 39.8 63.4 50.9
Morocco 10.3 37.9 59.5 22.0 26.7 62.1 21.7
Niger 12.3 20.5 27.4 19.4 22.7 50.6 21.1
Nigeria 25.5 31.7 41.7 44.0 48.9 49.3 57.3
Rwanda 9.8 17.7 21.5 18.3 23.5 42.9 31.1
Senegal 12.8 18.5 40.9 14.9 21.2 37.5 18.1
Seychelles 11.2 28.7 51.1 31.5 41.2 96.5 36.8
Sierra Leone 19.0 37.6 34.9 50.7 45.1 67.0 48.1
Somalia 17.6 33.3 27.0 52.1 36.6 29.4 64.5
Sudan 17.8 30.7 17.4 na 40.1 32.3 41.1
Swaziland 6.0 33.3 19.1 52.9 40.3 60.6 42.9
Tanzania 15.8 14.8 29.3 14.0 26.6 39.3 25.6
Togo 14.2 26.3 38.9 26.8 41.0 55.0 42.0
Tunisia 4.6 22.5 28.6 24.9 28.1 42.5 30.1
Zaire 17.9 30.8 40.2 30.2 37.2 47.8 46.8
Zambia 13.9 31.5 59.0 32.4 43.2 57.5 44.9
Average 13.2 24.7 34.3 27.4 32.2 50.4 35.0
Median 11.1 23.0 31.6 24.4 29.8 49.5 33.3
Standard-Deviation 5.5 8.6 13.6 12.0 8.8 14.3 11.6
18Table 2 - Panel II: Non-African recipients
Standard deviation (%)
Net receipts Commitments
GDP ODA Mult Bilat ODA Mult Bilat
Bangladesh 17.0 21.4 21.8 23.3 19.5 23.4 22.7
Bolivia 14.0 17.8 18.0 24.1 36.8 52.6 42.9
Costa Rica 18.4 29.8 30.1 40.4 38.9 57.9 49.9
Dominican Rep. 19.4 62.9 62.1 na 48.3 95.6 47.6
Ecuador 11.0 25.6 33.9 29.2 30.8 55.5 34.5
Guatemala 8.9 26.3 34.2 31.8 42.6 107.6 44.9
Guyana 14.8 37.7 53.7 31.7 71.4 91.2 77.5
Haiti 6.6 36.0 40.2 31.6 39.1 58.8 37.4
Honduras 9.2 19.3 37.7 20.0 43.2 62.0 43.1
India 11.0 19.9 26.8 25.3 19.1 21.6 29.3
Indonesia 7.6 20.3 28.7 22.5 33.1 62.6 33.0
Jamaica 15.2 29.8 43.1 31.0 32.8 72.8 39.5
Jordan 10.0 41.8 59.8 45.7 50.8 54.6 54.2
Malaysia 6.5 36.7 37.2 38.8 50.6 42.3 52.2
Mexico 16.4 39.2 na na 52.5 46.3 62.5
Nepal 11.1 18.8 17.3 21.0 28.9 42.3 30.0
Pakistan 13.4 20.0 24.1 25.2 23.4 na 33.1
Panama 12.2 43.8 na 51.3 74.2 84.0 86.0
Paraguay 25.8 33.7 62.5 34.2 43.0 90.5 45.7
Peru 13.3 25.5 36.9 28.9 27.6 67.0 32.0
Philippines 9.0 26.9 46.4 30.6 36.0 61.6 35.8
Salvador 11.7 17.9 37.2 28.5 34.4 68.6 45.1
Sri Lanka 13.3 16.6 23.6 18.7 23.5 47.5 25.7
Thailand 6.8 20.5 40.0 20.2 33.7 47.6 38.5
Uruguay 19.6 49.6 na 58.7 57.7 94.8 63.1
Average 12.9 29.5 37.1 31.0 39.7 62.9 44.3
Median 12.2 26.3 37.1 29.2 36.8 60.2 42.9
Standard Deviation 4.7 11.7 13.4 10.2 14.3 22.2 15.3
Notes: GDP is the gross domestic product in US$ (Source: World Bank). ODA is the ofﬁcial
development assistance, in US$ (Source: OECD). Mult and Bilat are the multilateral and
bilateral components of ODA. All series are expressed in per capita terms and deﬂated using
the implicit imports deﬂator (Source: World Bank) or, when missing, the UNCTAD’simport-
s price index. The period is 1969-95, except for Burundi (1972-95), Cape Verde (1975-93),
Guinea Bissau (1974-95), Liberia and Somalia (1969-89), Niger, Rwanda, Seychelles, Tan-
zania and Zaire (1969-93), Sierra Leone (1969-90), Sudan (1969-91), Bangladesh (1972-95),
Bolivia and Guyana (1969-94), and Jordan (1976-95). Sample moments are computed from
the cyclical component of the Hodrick–Prescott ﬁltered logarithms of the series. A “na” is
reported when the original series included non-positive numbers.
19Table 3: Volatility of donors’ output and foreign aid (1969-1995)
Standard deviations (%)
Net ODA Disbursements ODA Commitments
Donor country GDP Total Africa Others Total Africa Others
Australia 1.83 8.39 36.67 14.30 20.05 38.01 33.82
Austria 1.48 31.88 75.35 na 53.83 108.59 81.75
Belgium 1.84 7.35 7.18 24.01 17.85 90.27 31.34
Canada 2.62 9.37 13.39 14.81 20.79 36.31 25.69
Denmark 1.95 7.03 10.90 16.59 18.97 31.11 37.62
Finland 3.86 19.37 21.79 71.24 30.46 35.36 78.98
France 1.57 8.24 8.38 20.05 12.71 15.06 26.97
Germany 1.71 9.84 14.29 16.49 15.26 19.97 16.12
Ireland 2.87 23.13 24.41 31.10 23.25 24.40 31.10
Italy 1.83 115.36 na na 49.31 57.27 74.30
Japan 2.15 12.06 39.26 15.06 16.88 54.74 20.09
Netherlands 1.75 9.60 14.95 16.28 17.54 27.37 25.10
New Zealand 2.84 13.64 66.05 28.44 na na na
Norway 1.78 9.83 13.18 14.90 19.79 33.16 40.51
Sweden 2.05 11.61 17.03 25.91 17.37 28.19 34.91
Switzerland 2.40 10.23 15.22 21.72 20.90 36.11 45.48
United Kingdom 2.68 10.19 16.21 16.67 19.72 27.35 38.14
United States 2.18 9.94 28.41 16.71 21.86 50.21 19.52
Average 2.19 18.17 24.86 22.77 23.33 41.97 38.91
Median 2.00 10.07 16.21 16.69 19.79 35.36 33.82
Standard deviation 0.60 25.07 19.53 13.95 11.30 24.61 20.40
Notes: GDP is the gross domestic product per capita in constant local currency (1990=100). ODA
stands for ofﬁcial development assistance per capita in constant local currency; current US$ amounts
are converted into constant local currency using current exchange rates and local GDP deﬂators. All
data are from the OECD. Total stands for aid ﬂows to all aid recipients worldwide, whether in our
sample or not; Africa, for aid ﬂows to the 38 African countries in our recipient sample; Others, for
aid ﬂows to the 25 non-African recipients in the sample. The period is 1969-95, except for Austria
(1971-95), Belgium and Netherlands (1970-95), Germany (West Germany, 1969-90), Ireland (1974-
93) and New Zealand (1972-95). Sample moments are computed from the cyclical component of
the Hodrick–Prescott ﬁltered logarithms of the series. A “na” is reported when the original series
included non-positive numbers.
20Table 4: Cyclical properties of aid from the recipient point of view - Summary table
Africa Comovement with recipients’ GDP
ODA Mult Bilat




































Cape Verde + + + + + 0
Central Afr. Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chad + + + +
￿
* +







* 0 0 0
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0














) + + +





























Malawi 0 0 + 0 0 0
Mali – 0 – 0 0 0
Mauritania + – + 0
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Nigeria 0 0 + 0 0 0
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Sudan
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) – – –
Togo + + + + + +
Tunisia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zaire +
￿
















Outside of Comovement with recipients’ GDP
Africa ODA Mult Bilat
R C R C R C
Bangladesh + + + + + +












) + + 0 na +
Ecuador – 0 0 0 – –
Guatemala – – 0 – – 0
Guyana 0 0 0 0 – –

















Indonesia – – 0 0 – –












































* + 0 0
Philippines 0 +
￿
* + 0 +
Salvador – 0 0 0 0 0
Sri Lanka 0 – 0 0 0 0
Thailand +
￿





) 0 na –
￿
) 0
Notes: For each recipient, the table reports whether aid series are pro-
cyclical, countercyclical or acyclical with its GDP. R and C stand, re-
spectively, for net receipts and commitments. All other variables and
abbreviations are deﬁned in the note to Table 1. A “ +” indicates pro-
cyclicality, subscripts “L” and “l” stand respectively for lag and lead,
“ –” indicates countercyclicality. Details of the underlying correlation-
s are reported in Table 5. A correlation is judged to be non-different
from 0 if it lies in the interval (-0.29, 0.29).
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Benin GDP 0.03 0.63 1.00 0.63 0.03
ODA 0.36 0.57 0.28 0.10 -0.22
Mult 0.27 0.50 0.40 0.09 -0.11
Bilat 0.32 0.46 0.12 0.08 -0.23
Botswana GDP -0.00 0.49 1.00 0.49 -0.00
ODA 0.30 0.45 0.49 -0.10 -0.27
Mult 0.17 0.05 0.16 -0.30 -0.13
Bilat 0.37 0.51 0.47 0.02 -0.29
Burkina GDP 0.04 0.56 1.00 0.56 0.04
Faso ODA -0.37 0.02 0.48 0.24 -0.06
Mult -0.32 0.00 0.31 0.06 -0.21
Bilat -0.40 0.10 0.65 0.45 0.13
Burundi GDP 0.29 0.66 1.00 0.66 0.29
ODA 0.03 0.05 0.31 0.56 0.37
Mult -0.18 -0.22 0.23 0.48 0.60
Bilat 0.22 0.20 0.02 -0.06 -0.43
Came- GDP 0.47 0.62 1.00 0.47 0.62
roon ODA 0.08 0.03 0.41 0.45 0.29
Mult 0.05 0.09 0.38 0.17 0.05
Bilat 0.10 0.01 0.38 0.52 0.39
Cape GDP -0.27 0.19 1.00 0.19 -0.27
Verde ODA -0.26 0.06 0.70 -0.04 -0.12
Mult -0.29 0.12 0.70 -0.04 -0.08
Bilat -0.19 -0.07 0.34 -0.08 -0.24
Central GDP -0.25 0.36 1.00 0.356 -0.25
African ODA -0.25 0.17 0.01 -0.40 0.17
Rep. Mult -0.05 0.12 -0.15 -0.35 0.17
Bilat -0.35 0.09 0.15 -0.24 0.17
Chad GDP 0.03 0.30 1.00 0.30 0.03
ODA -0.08 0.20 0.55 0.55 0.21
Mult -0.02 0.17 0.38 0.37 0.17
Bilat -0.13 0.19 0.61 0.61 0.18
Congo GDP 0.22 0.57 1.00 0.57 0.22
ODA -0.07 -0.02 0.19 0.28 0.23
Mult 0.00 0.18 0.34 0.17 0.04
Bilat -0.18 -0.21 0.07 0.20 0.40
Cˆ ote GDP 0.12 0.68 1.00 0.68 0.12
d’Ivoire ODA 0.06 0.21 0.33 0.35 0.38
Mult -0.02 0.02 0.18 0.18 0.32
Bilat 0.05 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.20






























Egypt GDP -0.04 0.43 1.00 0.43 -0.04
ODA 0.03 -0.23 -0.01 -0.06 -0.27
Mult 0.03 -0.09 -0.02 -0.21 -0.38
Bilat 0.24 -0.06 -0.17 -0.19 -0.39
Gabon GDP -0.18 0.48 1.00 0.48 -0.18
ODA 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.07 -0.39
Mult -0.03 -0.27 -0.74 -0.37 0.18
Bilat -0.04 0.03 0.36 0.20 -0.29
Gambia GDP 0.27 0.56 1.00 0.56 0.27
ODA 0.01 0.49 0.47 0.22 0.07
Mult 0.09 0.39 0.21 0.10 0.17
Bilat -0.14 0.18 0.34 0.05 -0.24
Ghana GDP 0.18 0.66 1.00 0.66 0.18
ODA 0.51 0.68 0.69 0.25 -0.04
Mult 0.41 0.58 0.56 0.23 -0.11
Bilat 0.45 0.67 0.71 0.32 0.07
Guinea GDP -0.22 0.20 1.00 0.20 -0.22
Bissau ODA -0.60 -0.56 0.42 0.06 -0.24
Mult -0.54 -0.36 0.44 0.20 -0.25
Bilat -0.48 -0.52 0.13 -0.11 -0.25
Kenya GDP -0.01 0.59 1.00 0.59 -0.01
ODA -0.35 0.04 0.37 0.62 0.53
Mult -0.27 -0.10 0.31 0.55 0.46
Bilat -0.34 0.19 0.46 0.61 0.49
Lesotho GDP 0.09 0.35 1.00 0.35 0.09
ODA -0.09 0.04 0.31 0.09 0.26
Mult 0.08 0.08 0.38 -0.21 -0.02
Bilat -0.15 0.04 0.17 0.30 0.35
Liberia GDP -0.27 0.52 1.00 0.52 -0.27
ODA -0.24 0.05 0.22 0.04 -0.08
Mult -0.33 -0.21 0.12 0.42 0.54
Bilat -0.03 0.23 0.20 -0.17 -0.42
Mada- GDP -0.08 0.36 1.00 0.36 -0.08
gascar ODA -0.19 -0.10 0.29 0.16 -0.07
Mult -0.32 -0.14 0.21 0.26 -0.08
Bilat -0.01 0.01 0.35 0.11 0.05
Malawi GDP -0.03 0.28 1.00 0.28 -0.03
ODA 0.27 0.26 0.17 -0.17 -0.47
Mult 0.21 0.39 0.49 0.00 -0.25
Bilat 0.21 -0.04 -0.24 -0.31 -0.50
22Table 5, Panel I (continued)






























Mali GDP -0.27 0.35 1.00 0.35 -0.27
ODA 0.31 -0.17 -0.55 -0.40 0.11
Mult 0.20 -0.34 -0.64 -0.37 0.39
Bilat 0.18 -0.10 -0.26 -0.11 -0.05
Mauri- GDP -0.06 0.41 1.00 0.41 -0.06
tania ODA 0.01 0.38 0.53 0.35 0.46
Mult -0.21 0.26 0.53 0.31 0.44
Bilat 0.41 0.26 -0.13 -0.20 0.18
Mauri- GDP 0.20 0.57 1.00 0.57 0.20
tius ODA -0.00 0.35 0.46 0.14 0.10
Mult na na na na na
Bilat 0.07 0.20 0.36 0.15 0.26
Morocco GDP 0.10 0.55 1.00 0.55 0.10
ODA 0.06 0.32 0.22 0.15 0.41
Mult -0.42 -0.12 0.13 0.42 0.52
Bilat 0.48 0.46 0.23 -0.20 -0.13
Niger GDP 0.04 0.60 1.00 0.60 0.04
ODA 0.06 0.06 -0.06 -0.21 -0.23
Mult 0.35 0.24 0.11 -0.26 -0.49
Bilat 0.16 0.05 -0.17 -0.19 -0.25
Nigeria GDP 0.23 0.64 1.00 0.64 0.23
ODA -0.12 -0.08 0.12 -0.06 -0.56
Mult 0.07 0.34 0.67 0.52 0.03
Bilat -0.21 -0.33 -0.23 -0.33 -0.60
Rwanda GDP 0.14 0.46 1.00 0.46 0.14
ODA -0.06 0.19 0.63 0.14 0.00
Mult -0.22 -0.10 0.48 0.33 0.15
Bilat 0.07 0.41 0.65 -0.03 -0.18
Senegal GDP 0.10 0.62 1.00 0.62 0.10
ODA 0.02 0.18 0.31 0.38 0.38
Mult -0.04 0.27 0.47 0.42 0.32
Bilat 0.11 0.19 0.46 0.42 0.26
Sey- GDP 0.02 0.59 1.00 0.59 0.02
chelles ODA -0.09 0.52 0.70 0.46 -0.13
Mult 0.32 0.12 0.06 -0.06 -0.23
Bilat -0.07 0.52 0.73 0.54 -0.03






























Sierra GDP 0.03 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.03
Leone ODA 0.25 0.51 0.82 0.26 -0.21
Mult 0.38 0.59 0.64 0.00 -0.20
Bilat 0.08 0.42 0.79 0.36 -0.19
Somalia GDP -0.38 0.40 1.00 0.40 -0.38
ODA -0.15 0.20 0.49 0.12 0.08
Mult 0.05 0.36 0.29 -0.18 -0.24
Bilat -0.27 0.04 0.63 0.29 0.09
Sudan GDP 0.19 0.54 1.00 0.54 0.19
ODA 0.49 0.31 -0.12 -0.11 -0.46
Mult 0.17 0.08 -0.18 -0.18 -0.39
Bilat na na na na na
Swaziland GDP -0.07 0.24 1.00 0.24 -0.07
ODA 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.48 0.08
Mult -0.46 0.02 -0.02 -0.38 -0.08
Bilat 0.10 -0.06 0.06 -0.48 0.06
Tanzania GDP 0.22 0.61 1.00 0.61 0.22
ODA 0.04 -0.35 -0.63 -0.49 -0.23
Mult 0.35 0.12 -0.22 -0.35 -0.39
Bilat -0.21 -0.58 -0.75 -0.46 -0.07
Togo GDP -0.24 0.21 1.00 0.21 -0.24
ODA 0.10 0.07 0.55 0.09 -0.14
Mult 0.22 0.09 0.33 -0.16 -0.09
Bilat -0.04 0.05 0.69 0.38 -0.13
Tunisia GDP 0.02 0.19 1.00 0.19 0.02
ODA 0.13 0.09 0.03 -0.30 -0.41
Mult 0.24 0.08 -0.24 -0.41 -0.12
Bilat -0.08 0.11 0.16 -0.19 -0.35
Zaire GDP -0.35 0.16 1.00 0.16 -0.35
ODA -0.08 0.13 0.66 0.40 -0.00
Mult 0.24 0.23 0.66 0.06 -0.28
Bilat -0.25 0.07 0.61 0.50 0.13
Zambia GDP -0.12 0.36 1.00 0.36 -0.12
ODA 0.38 0.52 0.27 -0.14 -0.43
Mult 0.42 0.36 -0.18 -0.38 -0.49
Bilat 0.37 0.55 0.42 -0.01 -0.30
23Table 5, Panel II: Non-African recipients






























Bangladesh GDP -0.47 0.27 1.00 0.27 -0.47
ODA -0.25 0.27 0.76 0.05 -0.09
Mult -0.20 0.37 0.74 0.31 0.04
Bilat -0.17 0.20 0.75 0.01 -0.33
Bolivia GDP 0.24 0.59 1.00 0.59 0.24
ODA 0.29 0.39 0.49 0.10 -0.06
Mult 0.14 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.22
Bilat 0.27 0.40 0.53 0.10 0.03
Costa GDP 0.00 0.59 1.00 0.59 0.00
Rica ODA 0.17 0.29 0.17 -0.31 -0.58
Mult -0.19 0.03 0.31 0.14 -0.07
Bilat 0.31 0.32 0.01 -0.43 -0.63
Dominican GDP -0.25 0.1755 1.00 0.18 -0.25
Republic ODA 0.14 0.33 0.13 0.02 0.22
Mult 0.15 0.11 0.33 0.25 -0.02
Bilat na na na na na
Ecuador GDP 0.50 0.81 1.00 0.81 0.50
ODA -0.33 -0.42 -0.44 -0.47 -0.33
Mult -0.25 -0.14 -0.09 -0.22 -0.21
Bilat -0.30 -0.50 -0.51 -0.45 -0.28
Guatemala GDP 0.11 0.57 1.00 0.57 0.11
ODA -0.12 -0.24 -0.41 -0.45 -0.28
Mult 0.19 0.18 0.09 -0.10 -0.16
Bilat -0.22 -0.39 -0.54 -0.54 -0.29
Guyana GDP 0.19 0.37 1.00 0.37 0.19
ODA -0.15 -0.41 -0.20 -0.30 -0.44
Mult 0.04 -0.20 -0.13 -0.36 -0.43
Bilat -0.44 -0.65 -0.33 -0.14 -0.15
Haiti GDP -0.23 0.18 1.00 0.18 -0.23
ODA 0.16 0.06 -0.06 -0.14 0.04
Mult 0.13 0.02 -0.31 -0.31 -0.01
Bilat 0.13 0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.06
Honduras GDP -0.25 0.50 1.00 0.50 -0.25
ODA 0.47 0.37 -0.03 -0.19 -0.11
Mult 0.20 0.10 -0.09 -0.22 -0.31
Bilat 0.44 0.30 -0.09 -0.19 0.11
India GDP 0.01 0.40 1.00 0.40 0.01
ODA 0.53 0.09 -0.05 -0.25 0.04
Mult 0.16 0.01 0.03 -0.20 0.10
Bilat 0.42 0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.07






























Indo- GDP -0.01 0.52 1.00 0.52 -0.01
nesia ODA -0.18 -0.49 -0.42 -0.27 -0.21
Mult -0.13 -0.13 -0.19 -0.14 -0.27
Bilat -0.15 -0.48 -0.42 -0.26 -0.15
Jamaica GDP 0.24 0.64 1.00 0.64 0.24
ODA -0.36 -0.31 -0.01 0.27 0.23
Mult -0.19 -0.03 0.14 0.17 -0.02
Bilat -0.32 -0.28 -0.02 0.25 0.17
Jordan GDP 0.45 0.72 1.00 0.72 0.45
ODA 0.71 0.30 0.01 -0.41 -0.38
Mult 0.60 0.54 0.07 -0.29 -0.64
Bilat 0.10 -0.09 -0.49 -0.74 -0.55
Malay- GDP -0.29 0.31 1.00 0.31 -0.29
sia ODA -0.16 -0.10 0.02 0.10 0.15
Mult -0.06 0.04 0.18 0.19 0.02
Bilat -0.18 -0.14 -0.03 0.08 0.15
Mexico GDP 0.07 0.55 1.00 0.55 0.07
ODA -0.36 -0.33 0.07 0.58 0.32
Mult na na na na na
Bilat na na na na na
Nepal GDP -0.31 0.19 1.00 0.19 -0.31
ODA -0.22 -0.15 0.57 0.45 -0.14
Mult -0.05 -0.10 0.38 0.51 0.02
Bilat -0.23 -0.20 0.61 0.40 -0.24
Pana- GDP 0.11 0.64 1.00 0.64 0.11
ma ODA 0.47 0.59 0.38 -0.07 -0.46
Mult na na na na na
Bilat 0.42 0.46 0.28 -0.12 -0.48
Paki- GDP 0.03 0.61 1.00 0.61 0.03
stan ODA 0.12 0.23 0.21 -0.05 -0.07
Mult -0.01 0.08 0.20 0.05 0.37
Bilat -0.07 0.27 0.37 0.34 -0.00
Para- GDP 0.18 0.61 1.00 0.61 0.18
guay ODA -0.12 0.03 0.56 0.22 -0.05
Mult -0.53 -0.03 0.43 0.41 0.21
Bilat 0.05 0.13 0.59 0.12 -0.16
Peru GDP -0.33 0.24 1.00 0.24 -0.33
ODA 0.20 0.28 0.19 -0.15 -0.39
Mult -0.02 -0.06 0.13 0.18 0.38
Bilat 0.22 0.28 0.13 -0.20 -0.46
24Table 5, Panel II (continued)






























Philippines GDP 0.19 0.64 1.00 0.64 0.19
ODA -0.23 -0.14 0.12 -0.13 -0.22
Mult 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.41 0.17
Bilat -0.37 -0.25 0.02 -0.20 -0.21
Salvador GDP -0.06 0.59 1.00 0.59 -0.06
ODA -0.28 -0.36 -0.35 -0.36 -0.34
Mult -0.16 -0.21 0.07 0.29 0.21
Bilat -0.38 -0.16 -0.14 -0.32 -0.37
Sri Lanka GDP 0.26 0.57 1.00 0.57 0.26
ODA -0.23 -0.19 -0.18 -0.08 -0.03
Mult -0.12 -0.17 -0.01 0.13 0.17
Bilat -0.11 -0.21 -0.24 -0.15 -0.04
Thailand GDP -0.51 0.12 1.00 0.12 -0.51
ODA -0.07 0.02 0.37 0.11 -0.15
Mult -0.09 0.21 0.34 0.16 0.10
Bilat -0.31 -0.14 0.33 0.29 0.07
Uruguay GDP 0.08 0.46 1.00 0.46 0.08
ODA 0.21 0.50 0.26 -0.20 -0.43
Mult na na na na na
Bilat 0.03 0.48 0.40 0.03 -0.18
Notes: Entries are correlations of the cyclical components of the Hodrick–
Prescott ﬁltered logarithms of the series. The central column shows contempo-
raneous correlations. Columns to the right (left) are correlations with the series
shifted backward (forward) by one to two years. All variables are deﬁned in the
notes to Table 1. A correlation is judged to be non-different from 0 if it lies in
the interval (-0.29, 0.29).
25Table 6: Importance of foreign aid to donors (1969-1995)
Mean ratio of ODA to donor’s GDP (%)
Net Disbursements Commitments
Donor country Total Africa Others Total Africa Others
Australia 0.32 0.01 0.08 0.34 0.01 0.08
Austria 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.06 0.04
Belgium 0.32 0.21 0.04 0.34 0.20 0.04
Canada 0.29 0.07 0.10 0.36 0.10 0.13
Denmark 0.39 0.15 0.09 0.45 0.17 0.11
Finland 0.21 0.09 0.03 0.27 0.11 0.04
France 0.40 0.18 0.03 0.47 0.22 0.04
Germany 0.28 0.09 0.08 0.40 0.12 0.12
Ireland 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00
Italy 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.16 0.06 0.02
Japan 0.19 0.02 0.11 0.29 0.03 0.17
Netherlands 0.58 0.14 0.19 0.68 0.15 0.23
New Zealand 0.21 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.04
Norway 0.44 0.16 0.11 0.44 0.17 0.09
Sweden 0.51 0.13 0.10 0.55 0.14 0.10
Switzerland 0.18 0.05 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.06
United Kingdom 0.22 0.06 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.11
United States 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.06
Average 0.28 0.08 0.07 0.33 0.10 0.08
Median 0.25 0.07 0.07 0.32 0.09 0.07
Standard-deviation 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.07 0.06
Notes: GDPis thegrossdomesticproductpercapitainconstantlocalcurrency (1990=100).
ODA stands for ofﬁcial development assistance per capita in constant local currency; cur-
rent US$ amounts are converted into constant local currency using current exchange rates
and local GDP deﬂators. All data are from the OECD. Total stands for aid ﬂows to all aid
recipients worldwide, whether in our sample or not; Africa, for aid ﬂows to the 38 African
countries in our recipient sample; Others, for aid ﬂows to the 25 non-African recipients in
thesample. Ratios areaveragedover theperiod1969-95, exceptforAustria (1971-95), Bel-
gium and Netherlands (1970-95), Germany (West Germany, 1969-90), Ireland (1974-93)
and New Zealand (1972-95).
26Table 7: Cyclical properties of foreign aid from donors’ perspective
Comovements with donors’ GDP
Net ODA Disbursements ODA Commitments
Donor country Total Africa Others Total Africa Others


















































France – 0 0 0 0 0















































* 0 0 0 0
Switzerland
/





* 0 + +
/
*
United States 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: For each donor, the table reports whether that donor’s aid series are procyclical,
countercyclical or acyclical with its GDP. Variables and abbreviations are deﬁned in the
note toTable6. A “+”indicates procyclicality, subscripts “L” and “l”stand respectively for
lag and lead, “ –” indicates countercyclicality. The underlying correlations are considered
non-different from zero if they lie in the interval (-0.29, 0.29).
27Figure 1: Contemporaneous correlations between aid and recipient GDP
































































































Note: Figure 1 shows the distribution of the contemporaneous correlations between African recipients’ GDP and total ODA dis-
bursements (Fig. 1A), ODA disbursements from multilateral (Fig. 1B) and bilateral sources (Fig. 1C), and commitments (Fig.
1D-F).
28Figure 2: Aid-output correlations vs. income, volatility and aid dependency





































































































































































































































































Note: This ﬁgure plots the contemporaneous correlation between the cyclical components of the H-P ﬁltered logarithms of GDP
and ODA against the average level of per-capita output (ﬁrst column), the volatility of output (second column) or the average
ODA/GDP ratio (third column), for African (ﬁrst row), non-African (second row) and all 63 sample recipients. In each case, the
solid line is the OLS-ﬁtted line. Average GDP numbers in the ﬁrst column have been normalized so that the highest is 100.
29Figure 3: Part A - Selected countries, detrended series
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Note: Each ﬁgure plots the cyclical components of the HP-ﬁltered logarithms of the per-capita series (GDP: growth domestic
product; ODA: net disbursements of ofﬁcial development assistance; ODAc: ODA commitments; Grants: the grant component
of ODA; TA: the value of technical assistance). The ﬁrst and last two years of observations are not displayed as they have been
dropped when we computed correlations and standard deviations.
30Figure 3: Part B
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Note: Each ﬁgure plots the cyclical components of the HP-ﬁltered logarithms of the per-capita series (GDP: growth domestic
product; ODA: net disbursements of ofﬁcial development assistance; ODAc: ODA commitments; Grants: the grant component
of ODA; TA: the value of technical assistance). The ﬁrst and last two years of observations are not displayed as they have been
dropped when we computed correlations and standard deviations.
31Figure 3: Part C
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Note: Each ﬁgure plots the cyclical components of the HP-ﬁltered logarithms of the per-capita series (GDP: growth domestic
product; ODA: net disbursements of ofﬁcial development assistance; ODAc: ODA commitments; Grants: the grant component
of ODA; TA: the value of technical assistance). The ﬁrst and last two years of observations are not displayed as they have been
dropped when we computed correlations and standard deviations.
32